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HIS Article details the most significant developments in the law of
arrest, search, and confessions during the survey period. It reviews
federal and state cases implicating the critical procedural applications
of the fourth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution and the
corresponding provisions of Texas constitutional and statutory law. Because
of their direct and pervasive impact on the Texas criminal justice system,
several crucial opinions of the United States Supreme Court are discussed at
length. The survey period was indeed a dramatic one in this area, character-
ized by the continued dilution of judicially created limitations on police
power that previous courts had seen fit to impose for the enforcement of the
constitutional protections of the individual accused at the earliest stages of
the prosecution. This trend was primarily manifested in the fashioning of
several substantial exceptions to established procedural mechanisms that
were designed to further those ends, most notably to the now controversial
exclusionary rule.
I. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
The most significant procedural change effected on the law of search and
seizure in decades was wrought by the United States Supreme Court last
term in the companion cases of United States v. LeonI and Massachusetts v.
Sheppard.2 In those two cases the Court finally adopted a so-called good
faith exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 3 This much-
heralded exception, however, was hardly a surprise4 and may ultimately
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law.
Attorney at Law, Bruner, McColl, McColloch & McCurley, Dallas, Texas.
1. 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).
2. 104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1984).
3. The doctrine that eventually became known as the exclusionary rule had its roots in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886), and was formally adopted by the unanimous
Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The Court extended the
rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961), and ultimately applied it to
violations of the fifth amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966); Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). The Court also applied the rule to sixth amendment rights.
See, e.g., Stovall v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 274
(1967); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-92 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201, 201-04 (1964).
4. The Court manifested its enthusiasm for adopting a good faith exception in its opinion
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have little practical effect in light of the Court's decision a year earlier in
Illinois v. Gates.5 The Court in Gates drastically amended substantive fourth
amendment law by abandoning the traditional Aguilar-Spinelli6 two-pronged
test and replacing it with a much less strict totality of the circumstances
approach to probable cause determinations. 7 The Gates opinion also stated
clearly that a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant was to be upheld on
review as long as the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that
probable cause existed.8 In addition, the Court arguably lowered the stan-
dard for probable cause by defining it as "fair probability."9
The Court in Leon and Sheppard could have easily sustained the searches
at issue under the diluted standards of Gates, but chose not to do so.' 0 In-
stead, the Court formulated and pronounced what might be more accurately
described as an objectively reasonable reliance exception to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule. Specifically, the Court held that the rule
should not be applied so as to bar the use, in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a
search warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, but ultimately
found to be invalid."' The Court ostensibly based its conclusion on the re-
sults of a cost-benefit analysis it applied to the rule, which predictably re-
sulted in a determination that the "substantial costs"'1 2 clearly outweighed
the "marginal or non-existent benefits." 1 3
An analysis of the circumstances that will still require suppression of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment aids in understanding
the meaning and scope of the Court's holding. Suppression remains "an
appropriate remedy if the magistrate. . . in issuing a warrant was misled by
the previous year in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), in which the
Court had ordered re-argument on the proposed adoption of the exception, but eventually
apologized for not addressing the issue since it had not been pressed or passed upon below. Id.
at 2322, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 532. Previously at least five of the Justices now sitting had at some
time expressed sympathy for the adoption of a good faith exception. See Schroeder, Deterring
Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1363-
78 (1981).
5. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983).
6. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548; see McColloch, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
Criminal Procedure, 38 Sw. L.J. 529, 530-31 (1984).
8. 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 549.
9. Id. at 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548.
10. The Court could have remanded the cases for reconsideration or could have assessed
the sufficiency of the probable cause under the Gates totality of the circumstances approach.
Instead, the Court ignored its usual practice of deferring the rendering of decisions on impor-
tant constitutional issues when unnecessary for resolution of the case and decided the case on
its newly formulated good-faith exception. Justice White, writing for the majority, declared:
Although it undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question whether
probable cause existed under the "totality of the circumstances" test ... it is
also within our authority, which we choose to exercise, to take the case as it
comes to us, accepting the [lower court's] conclusion that probable cause was
lacking under the prevailing legal standards.
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 687.
11. Id. at 3419-20, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696-97.
12. Id. at 3413, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 688.
13. Id. at 3421, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
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information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth"14 or where
the issuing magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role such that he does
not qualify as neutral and detached.1 5 Objective good faith would also not
be present in cases where the warrant was based on an affidavit that lacked
sufficient indicia of probable cause, thereby rendering official reliance upon it
entirely unreasonable.16 Finally, the warrant itself may be so clearly defi-
cient on its face that the executing officers could not have reasonably pre-
sumed it to be valid.' 7
Cases would be few in which a search warrant based on an affidavit so
deficient as to fail even under the diluted standards set forth in Gates would
be sufficient to permit an officer to rely objectively upon it. In this light, the
benefits of this particular good faith exception are greatly diminished, if not
eliminated altogether. Its eventual impact may not be felt unless and until
the exception itself is strengthened or extended to the warrantless search and
arrest context.'
8
II. THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
In Nix v. Williams 19 the Supreme Court embraced the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule's application for violations of the individ-
ual's sixth amendment right to counsel. Following Williams's arrest and
arraignment for murder of a young girl, his attorney obtained an agreement
with the police that they would not question Williams while transporting
him back to the city where the girl disappeared. During the trip a police
detective delivered the now infamous "Christian burial speech," 20 which re-
sulted in William's agreement to take them to the girl's body.2' He indeed
led them to the body, and the prosecution introduced evidence of its location
and condition at trial. The Supreme Court held that even though the body
was found as a result of a violation of Williams's sixth amendment right to
14. Id.; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
15. 104 S. Ct. at 3422, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 699; see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.
319, 326 (1979).
16. 104 S. Ct. at 3422, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 699; see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11
(1975).
17. 104 S. Ct. at 3422, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 699.
18. The good faith exception the Court recognized in Leon and Sheppard applies presum-
ably only to searches conducted pursuant to warrants. Id.
19. 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984).
20. Id. at 2505, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 382. The detective urged Williams to reveal the body's
location so that the girl could receive a Christian burial. Id.
21. This appeal was Williams's second before the Court. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977), the Court reversed his conviction for murder because of the admission of his in-
criminating statements made during the detective's discussion with Williams on the need for a
Christian burial for the little girl. The Court concluded that the discussion constituted interro-
gation in violation of Williams's right to counsel. Id. at 400-01. The Court's opinion noted,
however, that even though these incriminating statements were inadmissible at a second trial,
evidence of the body's location and condition "might well be admissible on the theory that the
body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been
elicited from Williams." Id. at 407 n.12.
1985]
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counsel, 22 the exclusionary rule was inapplicable because the evidence
showed that searchers would have discovered the body eventually and in
substantially the same condition. 23 The prosecution had presented evidence
showing that authorities were conducting a systematic search of the area at
the time with the aid of 200 volunteers, who were only about three to five
hours away from discovery of the body. All nine Justices agreed 24 that evi-
dence is admissible if the prosecution can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that lawful means would inevitably have led to the discovery of the
challenged information. Under such circumstances suppression would not
deter any further violations of constitutional rights.25 The majority further
held that the prosecution need not prove the absence of bad faith in order to
take advantage of the inevitable discovery exception.2 6 The Court observed
that the doctrine of inevitable discovery, which all eleven circuits had previ-
ously recognized, 27 had its roots in the independent source doctrine28 and
was closely related in purpose to the harmless error rule.29
Several months prior to Williams the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
Miller v. State30 explicitly adopted the inevitable discovery exception on its
own. The court took the doctrine two steps further, however, by applying it
to both the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and the fifth amendment
exclusionary rule.31 For the first time, the court held that when evidence is
seized pursuant to an illegal search, it will nevertheless be admissible if a
court can later determine that the police would have ultimately discovered
the evidence. 32 In Miller police officers were on a routine patrol at night
22. Id. at 407 n. 12.
23. 104 S. Ct. at 2512, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 391.
24. Nix v. Williams was a 7-2 decision. The dissenters, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
disagreed only with the burden of proof adopted by the Court. Id. at 2517-18, 81 L. Ed. 2d at
397-98.
25. Id. at 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387.
26. Id. at 2510, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 388. The court of appeals had reversed Williams's convic-
tion on the ground that the prosecution had not met the requirement of proving that the police
did not act in bad faith. Nix v. Williams, 700 F.2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir. 1983).
27. United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Fisher,
700 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983); Government of V.1. v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 927-28 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042-44 (5th
Cir. 1980); Papp v. Jago, 656 F.2d 221, 222 (6th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Owens v.
Twomey, 508 F.2d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 306-07
(8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1065-66 n.9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 881 (1978); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982).
28. 104 S. Ct. at 2509, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387.
29. Id. at 2509 n.4, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387 n.4; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22
(1967).
30. 667 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
31. Id. at 776-78.
32. Id. at 778. Without actually calling it such, the court of criminal appeals has used the
inevitable discovery rationale in various other contexts before. See Vanderbilt v. State, 629
S.W.2d 709, 722-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 (1982); McMahon v.
State, 582 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919 (1979); Wyatt v.
State, 566 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973); Ex parte Parker, 485 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), affd on
other grounds sub nom. Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
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when they happened upon the defendant who appeared intoxicated. One of
the officers stopped him and observed a clear plastic baggie containing a
white powdery substance sticking out of the defendant's shirt pocket. Be-
cause the officer suspected that the substance was a narcotic, he grabbed the
baggie from the defendant's pocket and placed the defendant under arrest
for possession of a controlled substance. The court held that, assuming the
seizure was illegal under the plain view doctrine, the officer conducted a frisk
in accordance with the Supreme Court's holding in Terry v. Ohio, 3 3 which
presumably would have resulted in a discovery and seizure of the baggie
anyway. 34 Further, because the officer testified that he already intended to
arrest the defendant for public intoxication at the time he saw the baggie, the
court decided that he would have had the right to conduct a search incident
to that arrest. 35 The police would, therefore, have eventually found the bag-
gie even had it not been seen in plain view. 36 Thus, the court of criminal
appeals appears to encourage a reviewing court to conduct a de novo deter-
mination of a right to search under alternative justifications based on the
likely scenarios presented by the facts and circumstances of the case. 37
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals approved the application of the in-
evitable discovery doctrine to the fifth amendment exclusionary rule in
Wicker v. State.3s The evidence showed that the defendant had abducted a
963 (1975); Santiago v. State, 444 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); cf. Pitts v. State,
614 S.W.2d 142, 143-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169, 172-73
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Noble v. State, 478 S.W.2d 83, 84-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (in all
three cases, the Texas courts refused to admit evidence obtained in violation of constitutional
privileges, regardless of other lawful means to the evidence).
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A police officer may detain and frisk an individual, even if he does
not have probable cause to arrest that person, if he has reason to believe that the person threat-
ens the public's or the officer's own safety. Id. at 20-27.
34. 667 S.W.2d at 778.
35. Id.; see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
36. 667 S.W.2d at 778.
37. The court actually held that the officer performed a valid plain view seizure on the
ground that experience and common sense justified his suspicion. 667 S.W.2d at 777. This
holding is inconsistent, however, with the Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Brown, 103 S.
Ct. 1535, 1543-44, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 514-15 (1983), and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals'
own opinion the previous year in Gonzales v. State, 648 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983). In Miller the officer testified as to his general law enforcement training but failed to
state that he had any prior narcotics training or experience in narcotics arrests. 667 S.W.2d at
776. The officer suspected it was a narcotic, but offered no explanation as to what led him to
this suspicion. 667 S.W.2d at 777. In Brown and Gonzales, however, the courts held that a
nexus must be shown to exist between the officer's past training and experience and his assess-
ment that he has probable cause to seize a substance pursuant to the immediately apparent
requirement of the plain view doctrine. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514; Gonza-
les, 648 S.W.2d at 687. This nexus is established by testimony demonstrating the validity of
the officer's suspicion in light of his specific experience or training with regard to similar suspi-
cious circumstances. Brown, 103 S. Ct. at 1543, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 514; Gonzales, 648 S.W.2d at
687; see also Sullivan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (state can show the
officer's specialized knowledge, in combination with the circumstances of the particular case,
to establish the nexus); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (officer's
suspicions can be based on well-known facts, such as the popular method of storing heroin in
balloons). The court upheld the seizure in Miller despite the lack of any articulable facts
concerning such specialized knowledge or training which would have established the nexus.
667 S.W.2d at 777.
38. 667 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
1985]
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young woman and taken her to a beach in Galveston, where he choked her
and then buried her alive. After he was arrested, he gave two written state-
ments and three oral statements to the police. One of the oral statements led
the police to the discovery of the body. The defendant challenged the admis-
sibility of that oral statement as well as all of the evidence that resulted from
the statement and discovery of the body. The court of criminal appeals held
that deciding the admissibility of the oral statement was unnecessary because
the state presented evidence under the doctrine of the inevitable discovery
rule.39 The trial court had entered a conclusion of law that either law en-
forcement officers or private citizens inevitably would have discovered the
body. With little discussion or explanation, the court of criminal appeals
concluded that the record supported that finding 4° and that in any event the
body could have been recovered because of a precise description of its loca-
tion provided in one of the defendant's written statements that was found to
be admissible. 41
III. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES
Because the Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois v. Gates42 dealt only with
a search pursuant to a warrant, the question remained whether or not
Gates's "totality of the circumstances" approach would apply to warrantless
searches. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
answered this question affirmatively during the survey period. In United
States v. Mendoza43 the court applied the Gates analysis to the warrantless
search of an automobile made pursuant to a tip from an anonymous inform-
ant." Without discussing its reasons for its application,45 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the totality of the circumstances, which included substantial
corroboration of virtually all of the details of the informant's tip, was suffi-
cient to establish probable cause.46
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals greatly expanded the Gates ap-
proach in Eisenhauer v. State,47 by holding not only that the totality of the
circumstances standard applies to warrantless arrests and searches, but also
that the substantial basis standard of review permitted in deference to magis-
trates' decisions applies in an assessment of a police officer's actions as
well. 48 A police officer in Eisenhauer received a tip from an unnamed in-
formant, whose credibility was not shown, that the defendant would be de-
39. Id. at 141-42.
40. Presumably, beachcombers or police officers would have eventually happened upon
the body after it had become exposed due to beach erosion. Id. at 141.
41. Id. at 141-42.
42. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); see supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
43. 722 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983).
44. Id. at 100-02.
45. The Court merely cited Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 722 F.2d at 100
n.5.
46. 722 F.2d at 102.
47. 678 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
48. Id. at 952-53.
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parting from a Houston airport that day at a specified time on a flight to
Miami and would return to Houston later that day with cocaine in his pos-
session. The informant had also given the officer a detailed description of
the defendant, including the clothes that he would be wearing. The officer
independently confirmed that the defendant was on the flight and awaited
his return that evening. He saw an individual who fitted the tipster's de-
scription leave the plane. That individual, the defendant, carried a bag and
nervously scanned the gate lobby as he walked toward an exit. The officer
and his partner stopped and questioned him. They were joined by four
plainclothes officers who accused the defendant of transporting narcotics.
The defendant appeared anxious, according to the officers, but finally
handed over his coat, in which a bag of cocaine was found. The court of
criminal appeals held that the police officer's corroboration of the tipster's
information, along with the defendant's actions in the airport terminal and
his nervous reaction when the officers accused him of possessing cocaine,
established a substantial basis for the officer to decide that probable cause
existed to arrest the defendant under the totality of the circumstances test.49
Thus the court clearly used the diminished substantial basis standard of re-
view, even though a court can justifiably use that standard only when assess-
ing the legality of searches conducted pursuant to warrants. Courts have
long held that the standards applicable in determining whether the facts of
the case support an officer's probable cause assessment at the time of the
challenged warrantless arrest and search are at least as stringent as the stan-
dards applied when reviewing the decisions of a magistrate. 50 The Supreme
Court in Gates firmly established a more lenient and deferential standard for
reviewing magistrates' decisions. The sole rationale for this substantial basis
standard is the principle that a magistrate's "determination of probable
cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts," 5' which "serves
the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure. ' 52 This stan-
dard is probably best understood in light of the court's advice that despite
difficulties in determining whether a warrant shows probable cause, courts
should decide marginal cases by according preference to warrants.5 3 The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in using the substantial basis standard in
its decision in Eisenhauer v. State,54 has at least implicitly abrogated the
Supreme Court's policy of encouragement of the warrant process and has
attached the same degree of deference to the actions of the police officer as
49. Id. at 955.
50. See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565-67 (1971);
Ochs v. State, 543 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977);
Truitt v. State, 505 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Cole v. State, 484 S.W.2d 779,
781-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
51. Spinnelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); see Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2331, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 547 (1983).
52. 103 S. Ct. at 2331, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 547. The Court has observed that "a grudging or
negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants" is inconsistent with the fourth amend-
ment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. United States v. Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
53. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).
54. 678 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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that accorded the neutral and detached magistrate. Thus, the precedential
value of this aspect of Eisenhauer is questionable.
IV. FACTORY SURVEYS
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado" the Supreme Court
held that INS "factory surveys" do not violate fourth amendment principles,
at least during those surveys in which government agents imposed no acts of
individual physical restraint. 56 The "survey" at issue in Delgado involved
numerous agents who appeared unannounced in a workplace pursuant to an
administrative warrant. Some agents stood near the exit doors while the rest
roamed about the interior of the building questioning workers as to their
citizenship. The agents displayed badges, carried walkie-talkies, and were
armed, although their weapons were never drawn. The agents placed no one
individually under actual physical restraint. The process lasted from one to
two hours. The Ninth Circuit had previously held that by fourth amend-
ment standards the entire work force was seized for the duration of the sur-
vey, on the ground that the stationing of agents at the doors to the buildings
would have led a reasonable worker to believe that he could not leave. 57 The
Ninth Circuit further held that the individual questioning of the workers
violated the fourth amendment because the agents had no reasonable suspi-
cion that any particular employee being questioned was an alien illegally in
the country. 58 The Supreme Court, however, concluded that neither the in-
dividual workers nor the individuals questioned were seized within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 59 The mere fact that agents remained
near the factory doors during the survey was insufficient to constitute the
degree of intimidation necessary to create a reasonable belief in a person that
he was not free to leave. 6° No individual fourth amendment seizure would
have occurred unless agents had physically detained one of the workers for
refusal to answer the agents' questions. 6 1 In so holding, the Court has re-
vealed a strong skepticism towards arguments that an intimidating psycho-
logical environment sufficiently demonstrates that a reasonable person
55. 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984).
56. 104 S. Ct. at 1765, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 258. A factory survey is a sweep search through a
workplace, in which agents look for illegal aliens. Id. at 1763.
57. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 634 (9th Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984).
58. 681 F.2d at 639-45. Delgado reached the Supreme Court as an appeal from summary
judgment for the INS in a suit by four of the workers for injunctive relief directed at prevent-
ing the INS from questioning them personally during any future surveys. 104 S. Ct. at 1761,
80 L. Ed. 2d at 253.
59. 104 S. Ct. at 1763, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 256.
60. Id. at 1764, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 256. The Court observed that the agents did not actually
prevent the workers from either moving about the factories or walking outside pursuant to
their employment duties. Id.
61. Id. The Court relied upon its recent opinion in Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1326, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 239 (1983), wherein DEA agents approached the defendant because he
matched a drug courier profile and asked him for his airplane ticket and driver's license, which
the agents examined. The majority of the Court concluded that the request and examination
of the documents were permissible in themselves. 103 S. Ct. at 1337-38 n.3, 75 L. Ed. 2d at
253 n.3.
[Vol. 39
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would have believed he was not free to leave. 62
V. OPEN FIELDS DOCTRINE
The open fields doctrine, which the Supreme Court first enunciated some
sixty years ago in Hester v. United States,63 permits police officers to enter
and search a field without a warrant. Since then the Court has clearly stated
that the overriding test for determining the scope of fourth amendment pro-
tection is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. 64 Some courts have used this expectation of privacy
approach to attach some degree of fourth amendment protection to spaces
that should be considered open fields.65 The Court last term finally dispelled
the notion that a legitimate expectation of privacy could attach to open fields
in some circumstances in Oliver v. United States,66 in which police officers
had trespassed on a farm after passing a locked gate and a no-trespassing
sign. They eventually found a field of marijuana approximately a mile from
the defendant's house. The marijuana patch was growing in a highly se-
cluded field, bound on all sides by woods, fences, and embankments, and was
not visible from any point of public access. 67 The Court reaffirmed Hester6"
and held that an individual cannot reasonably expect privacy for outside
activities, except in the immediate vicinity of his home.69 The search of an
62. 104 S. Ct. at 1763, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 256. The Court does not appear to embrace the
approach discussed in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), in which the Court
suggested that such circumstances might include "the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled." Id. at 554.
63. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). The doctrine was grounded in the precise wording of the fourth
amendment, which extends its protection to the people only in their "persons, houses, papers,
and effects," not open fields. Id. at 59.
64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740-41 (1979).
65. Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court so held in the companion case to Oliver.
State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489, 495 (Me. 1982); cf. State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093, 1095-96
(Fla. 1981); State v. Buyers, 359 So. 2d 84, 87 (La. 1978) (in both cases courts refused to apply
the open fields doctrine).
66. 104 S. Ct. 1735, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984).
67. The defendant was indicted for manufacturing a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1982). The trial court suppressed the evidence of the marijuana fields under Katz,
see supra note 64 and accompanying text, concluding that this was not an open field that
invited casual intrusion. The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court, finding
no sufficient reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (6th
Cir. 1982).
68. See supra note 63.
69. 104 S. Ct. at 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 224. The land juxtaposing the home is the curti-
lage. In common law "the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associ-
ated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' " Id. at 1742, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
225 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). This contiguous area is, there-
fore, considered part of the home itself for fourth amendment purposes. Courts have defined
the curtilage in regard to factors that determine whether someone may reasonably expect that
an area adjacent to his home will remain private. 104 S. Ct. at 1742, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 225; see
United States v. van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams,
581 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1978); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
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open field simply does not constitute a search within the scope of the fourth
amendment because an individual cannot expect open fields to remain free of
warrantless intrusion by government officials. 70 The fact that government
agents' intrusion onto private property may constitute a common law or
statutory trespass is insufficient to legitimize any privacy expectations. 71
Similarly situated defendants in Texas might fare better by invoking Texas
law since the statutory exclusionary rule contained in article 38.23 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 72 would very likely result in suppression under
facts such as those in Oliver.73
VI. COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABLE CAUSE
A sharply divided court of criminal appeals held in Woodward v. State74
that the collective knowledge of all law enforcement personnel connected
with a case may be used on review to support a finding of probable cause. 75
This doctrine is applicable even if the arresting officer or agency has no prob-
able cause at the time of an arrest or search, and even when the officers or
agencies involved have had no substantial degree of communication.76 In
Woodward the Austin police transmitted statewide a "BOLO" message77 for
the defendant, who was a suspect in a murder that had occurred several
hours earlier. The Austin police did not have probable cause to arrest the
defendant at the time they issued the bulletin. 78 A deputy sheriff in another
county stopped and arrested the defendant, who was found on a road leading
away from Austin some two hours after the killing. A subsequent search of
his automobile revealed the murder weapon, which the state introduced at
trial. On original submission, the court of criminal appeals unanimously
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the police did not have probable
70., 104 S. Ct. at 1742, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 225-26.
71. Id. at 1743-44, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227. The existence of a property right is but one
element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. Id.; see Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 144-45 n.12 (1978). The dissent in Oliver emphasized the fact that the
officers' actions in that case appeared to have constituted a violation of the state's criminal
trespass statute, KY. REV. STAT. §§ 511.070(1), .080, .909(4) (1975 & Supp. 1982). 104 S. Ct.
at 1747-48, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 231-32 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979) provides:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provi-
sions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or
laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the
accused on the trial of any criminal case.
73. Criminal trespass is proscribed by § 30.05 of the Texas Penal Code, which provides
that "[a] person commits an offense if he enters or remains on property or in a building of
another without effective consent and he had notice that the entry was forbidden." TEX. PE-
NAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The code defines the notice element as
including "fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders" or "a sign or
signs posted on the property or at the entrance to the building, reasonably likely to come to the
attention of intruders, indicating that entry is forbidden." Id. § 30.05(b)(2)(B), (C).
74. 668 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on rehearing en banc).
75. Id. at 344.
76. Id. at 346.
77. A "BOLO" is a "be on the look-out" bulletin.
78. The message contained the name of the defendant and a description of his automobile,
along with a request that he be held for questioning if located.
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cause when they issued the "BOLO." '79 This decision was consistent with a
prior holding in which the court had stated that "[t]he test as to probable
cause in such cases where the officers act solely upon a request for arrest is
the information known to the officer who requests another officer to effect
the arrest." 80 On the state's motion for rehearing, however, a bare majority
upheld the validity of the defendant's arrest by concluding that the facts
known to the arresting agency, when added to the suspicious facts known to
the requesting agency, were sufficient to constitute probable cause.8"
The Fifth Circuit has previously recognized a more limited version of the
collective knowledge doctrine, emphasizing that cooperative efforts among
police produce more effective police work, given the mobile nature of society
today.8 2 The Fifth Circuit, however, has generally required a showing of
substantial communication among the various officers and agencies before
invoking the doctrine.8 3 The court of criminal appeals, however, held that
the doctrine applied to cases in which law enforcement agencies or personnel
cooperated in some way, a4 which will always be the case when one officer or
agency is conducting an arrest or resultant search at the request of another.
Thus, Texas courts can now conduct a de novo review of the total informa-
tion known to all the police or government agents working on the case in
determining whether probable cause was sufficient for an arrest or search.8 5
Several months later the court of criminal appeals clarified the Woodward
principle by ruling that it could validate any aspect of an arrest or search,
not just the probable cause determination. In Bain v. State8 6 officers in
Dalhart issued a bulletin for the apprehension of the defendant who was
suspected of a murder, but did not obtain an arrest warrant before sending
out the bulletin. Another law enforcement agency arrested the defendant in
another town the next day and transported him back to Dalhart where he
signed a confession while in custody. The court of criminal appeals, relying
on Woodward, held that the escape exception to the warrant requirement
was applicable in light of the collective knowledge of all of the law enforce-
ment personnel working on the case,87 regardless of whether the arresting
officer knew or thought the defendant was in the process of escaping.8 8
79. 668 S.W.2d at 341.
80. Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
81. 668 S.W.2d at 346.
82. Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1969).
83. See United States v. Sanchez, 689 F.2d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Moreno-Vallejo v.
United States, 414 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1969).
84. 668 S.W.2d at 344.
85. Id. Indeed, the court in Woodward went so far as to base probable cause in part upon
a fact of which the court took judicial notice. The state produced no evidence, however, that
any of the law enforcement officers were aware of the fact. Id. at 343 n.6.
86. 677 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
87. 677 S.W.2d at 55-56.




Even though a legitimate expectation of privacy may no longer attach to
open fields,8 9 a plurality of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the salience of this
test for defining fourth amendment protection in other contexts. Specifi-
cally, the Court held in Michigan v. Clifford90 that the test applies to admin-
istrative searches. 9 1 The Court also demonstrated that authorities cannot
use the administrative search as a guise to evade the warrant requirement if
the true purpose of the search is to gather evidence of criminal activity.92
Arson investigators in Clifford entered a fire-damaged house without a war-
rant hours after the fire had been extinguished. Authorities showed no exi-
gent circumstances and did not obtain the homeowner's consent to enter the
house. Through Justice Powell, the Court held that because the home had
not been totally destroyed, a reasonable expectation of privacy remained. 93
This expectation, coupled with the fact that the primary objective of the
search was to find criminal evidence, rendered the warrantless search
unconstitutional.94
The Court has long held that even administrative searches generally re-
quire warrants. 95 Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases that
mostly involve heavily regulated businesses or industries,96 the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth and fourteenth amendments governs the nonconsen-
sual entry and search of property. The Court held several years ago in
Michigan v. Tyler97 that, once having entered a fire-damaged building, offi-
cials need no warrant to remain for a reasonable period while investigating
the fire's cause. 98 But the Court pointed out in Clifford that if reasonable
expectations of privacy remain after the fire has been extinguished and offi-
cials have left the scene, further investigations generally require a warrant or
the existence of some new exigency.99 If a warrant is necessary, the object of
the search determines the type of warrant required. If the primary object is
to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant
will suffice. 10 Of course, if officials discover evidence of criminal activity
during the course of a valid administrative search, they may seize such evi-
89. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
90. 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984).
91. Id. at 647, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 485.
92. Id., 78 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
93. Id. at 648-49, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 486.
94. Id., 78 L. Ed. 2d at 487.
95. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 324 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531-33 (1967); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967).
96. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining); United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972) (sale of firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
(1970) (liquor industry).
97. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
98. Id. at 510.
99. 104 S. Ct. at 647, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
100. Probable cause for the issuance of an administrative warrant exists if the circum-
stances of the particular case meet reasonable legislative, administrative, or judicially pre-
scribed standards for conducting an inspection of the particular dwelling. See Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
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dence under the plain view doctrine. 10 1 If the primary object of the search,
however, is to gather evidence of criminal activity, officials must obtain a
criminal search warrant, which requires a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve that they will find such evidence in the place to be searched., 0 2 Thus,
administrative investigations into the causes and origins of fires are not ex-
empt from the warrant requirement unless officials can show certain exigent
circumstances to justify a post-fire search. 10 3 Because the fire in Clifford had
long been extinguished and part of the house remained intact, the arson in-
vestigators' warrantless search for criminal evidence was not justified. 1°4
VIII. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION TO MIRANDA
For the first time, the Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the
clear rule it set out eighteen years ago in Miranda v. Arizona.10 In Miranda
the Court extended the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination to individuals subjected to custodial interrogation by the po-
lice. 106 Hence, statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible
unless the police specifically informed the suspect of his Miranda rights, and
the defendant then freely decided to waive them. 107 In New York v.
Quarles0 8 the Court created a public safety exception to the requirement
that police must give a suspect the warnings outlined in Miranda before a
court will admit a suspect's answers into evidence.' 0 9 In Quarles several
policemen with drawn pistols confronted and surrounded the suspect in a
supermarket, into which the police had chased him after receiving informa-
tion that he had just committed a rape and was armed with a gun. The
101. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971). Law enforcement
agencies may then use evidence so obtained for the purpose of establishing probable cause to
obtain a criminal search warrant to discover additional evidence. Clifford, 104 S. Ct. at 647,
78 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
102. 104 S. Ct. at 647, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
103. Id. at 646, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 484. As the Court in Clifford pointed out, an imminent
threat that the fire might start again would present an exigency justifying a warrantless and
nonconsensual post-fire investigation. Id. at 647 n.4, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 484 n.4. As the Court
had previously observed in Tyler, a need could-exist for immediate investigation in order to
preserve evidence from intentional or accidental destruction. 436 U.S. at 510.
104. Although the search at issue in Tyler also involved a re-entry several hours after the
fire had been extinguished, the Court upheld the warrantless search because it was considered
a mere continuation of the initial investigation begun while firemen were still extinguishing the
flames. Officials could not complete the original investigative search into the origin of the fire
because of smoke and darkness, and resumed their investigation promptly the next morning.
436 U.S. at 511. The four-Justice dissent in Clifford relied upon Tyler in claiming that the
subsequent warrantless search of the fire-damaged portion of the home was authorized. Clif-
ford, 104 S. Ct. at 653, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 492 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even the dissent,
however, agreed that officials could not have searched the remaining parts of the house with-
out a warrant issued upon probable cause. Id.
105. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
106. Id. at 460-61.
107. The warnings required by Miranda involved the right to remain to silent, the right not
to answer questions or give a statement, and the right to advice of counsel. Id. at 468. Sus-
pects are also informed that they have the right to appointed counsel in the event that they
cannot afford to retain a lawyer. Id.
108. 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984).
109. Id. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557.
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policemen frisked the suspect and discovered that he was wearing an empty
shoulder holster. After handcuffing him, one of the officers asked him where
the gun was. The suspect nodded in the direction of some empty cartons
and responded that the gun was there. The officer then retrieved a loaded,
.38 caliber revolver from one of the cartons and formally placed the suspect
under arrest and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card. The New
York courts held that the gun and the suspect's statement were inadmissable
as a result of the Miranda violation.110 The Supreme Court, though, held
that statements and evidence derived therefrom are now admissible despite
the failure to administer the Miranda warnings if police officers obtain state-
ments in response to questions "reasonably prompted by a concern for the
public safety."II The Court noted that the police in Quarles faced the ur-
gent need to discover the location of a gun that they could reasonably believe
the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the
supermarket. So long as the gun remained in the supermarket, it threatened
the police and the public in that an accomplice might make use of it or a
customer or employee might later come upon it.112 The Court concluded
that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the
public safety outweighed the benefits from a rigid application of the holding
in Miranda.'13
Although the Court did not explicitly so state, the test for determining
whether the public safety exception applies is an objective one, once again
necessitating de novo judicial review. Indeed, the Court conceded that no
evidence was found in the record that concern for the public safety in fact
motivated the officer in Quarles to ask his question about the gun. 114 The
Court specifically held that the decision to apply the exception in a particu-
lar case does not turn on the officers' motivation. 15 The Court also ac-
knowledged that to some degree it had lessened the desirable clarity of the
Miranda rule. 116 But the Court believed that, despite the lack of clarity,11 7
police officers can apply the exception with little difficulty because they can
110. People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1981), affid, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444
N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982).
111. 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558.
114. Id. at 2630-32, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 555. The New York Court of Appeals found no
evidence suggesting that any of the officers feared for his own physical or the public's safety.
444 N.E.2d at 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
115. 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557.
116. Id. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558. The Court has often recognized the importance of a
clear and workable rule especially for police officers who must make frequent and quick
choices with only limited legal expertise. Id.; see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14
(1979) (Court noting need for a single, understandable standard for police to follow).
117. Justice O'Connor based her dissent in part on her view that the exception complicates
the requirements of Miranda. She opined that "[tihe end result will be a fine-spun new doc-
trine on public safety exigencies incident to custodial interrogation, complete with the hair-
splitting distinctions that currently plague our fourth amendment jurisprudence." 104 S. Ct.
at 2636, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 562. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Three
other Justices joined in dissent, and Justice Marshall observed that law enforcement agencies
will have to suffer the frustration of uncertainty while the courts decide what this new doctrine
means. Id. at 2634, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 573 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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know "almost instinctively" the difference between questions asked in regard
to their own or the public's safety and questions asked to produce testimo-
nial evidence.1 18
IX. SELF-INCRIMINATION: THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND PROBATION
OFFICERS
In Minnesota v. Murphy1 19 the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether the requirements placed on federal or state probationers to meet
regularly with probation officers and truthfully answer their questions, as a
condition of remaining on their conditional release, implicates the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court has previously
recognized that, if an officer of a state asks a person a question under cir-
cumstances that deprive him of a free choice to affirm or deny or to remain
silent and he answers the question without attempting to assert his privilege
against self-incrimination, the law will label his response "compelled" and
courts will not admit the response as evidence against him.' 20 The state will
have deprived the person of the choice to answer if the defendant is
threatened after he chooses not to answer.' 2' The defendant in Murphy met
with his probation officer pursuant to a requirement of his probation that he
attend such meetings periodically and be truthful with the officer. His pro-
bation officer had previously received information from a treatment coun-
selor that the defendant had admitted to a 1974 rape and murder. The
officer questioned him on the subject and Murphy confessed. The probation
officer did not advise Murphy of his rights with any Miranda warnings and
Murphy did not attempt to invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when he was questioned. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that because the probationer was under court order to respond truthfully
and the probation officer had substantial reason to believe that Murphy's
answers were likely to be incriminating, the confession was inadmissible.' 22
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a probationer in this situation
must assert the privilege against self-incrimination or the court will consider
it waived.' 23 The Court observed that the legal compulsion to attend a
meeting with a probation officer and to answer his questions truthfully is
indistinguishable from the compulsion felt by any witness who must appear
and give testimony.' 24 Furthermore, the probationer was not in custody for
118. Id. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559. The gun may very well have been admissible under
these facts pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception announced earlier in Nix v. Williams,
104 S. Ct. at 2508, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 386; see supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text. The
dissent would have remanded the case to the New York courts for further consideration in
light of Williams, 104 S. Ct. at 2650, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting), but the
majority saw no need to discuss that doctrine in light of its holding that no constitutional need
existed for suppression in the first place. 104 S. Ct. at 2634 n.9, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559 n.9.
119. 104 S. Ct. 1136, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984).
120. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1976); Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
121. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973).
122. Murphy v. State, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982).
123. 104 S. Ct. at 1149, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 428.
124. Id. at 1147, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 426.
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purposes of receiving the protection dictated by Miranda, because no formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest was present.1 25 Generally, if the state presents a person with
the choice of incriminating himself or suffering a penalty and he nevertheless
refuses to respond, the state cannot constitutionally make good on its threat
to penalize him.1 26 Conversely, if the threatened person decides to talk in-
stead of asserting his privilege, the state can use the admissions against him
in a subsequent criminal prosecution.1 27 In the probation context, the Mur-
phy court concluded that the probation officer did not compel the proba-
tioner to answer because revocation of probation for refusing to answer
questions under an assertion of a fifth amendment privilege would be uncon-
stitutional, and the state could not effect its threat. 128 Probationers therefore
have the right to invoke the fifth amendment privilege when answering a
probation officer's questions, regardless of any court-imposed requirement
that the probationer answer all of the officer's questions truthfully. Any
admissions he does make to the officer, however, will be admissible in a sub-
sequent prosecution.' 29
X. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Pannell v. State130 confronted a
question of first impression involving the applicability of Texas's statutory
exclusionary rule' 3 ' to evidence obtained in violation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. In Pannell the defendant, charged with murder, was
represented by two court-appointed attorneys. The district attorney subse-
quently interviewed the defendant prior to trial without attempting to obtain
the consent of the attorneys, action which violated DR 7-104(A)(1).132
125. Id. at 1144-45, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 425. The Court noted that the probationer's situation
is essentially indistinguishable from that facing suspects who are questioned in noncustodial
settings and grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an investigation or that they
are considered potential defendants. Id. at 1145, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 425; see United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-48
(1976). Thus, the probationer cannot claim the benefit of the custodial interrogation exception
to the general rule that the fifth amendment right is not self-executing. 104 S. Ct. at 1146, 79
L. Ed. 2d at 424.
126. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S.
273, 277-78 (1968).
127. Garrety v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
128. 104 S. Ct. at 1148, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 427.
129. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. One previous Texas court confronted this
same question and reached the same result. In Trimmer v. State, 651 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex.
App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1983, pet. ref'd), the court held that the court could use statements
made to a probation officer in preparation of a court-ordered pre-sentence report in assessing
punishment, despite the lack of any Miranda warnings. See also Baumann v. United States,
692 F.2d 565, 575-78 (9th Cir. 1981) (not necessary to warn a convicted defendant of his rights
during a pre-sentencing interview).
130. 666 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
131. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979); see supra note 72.
132. Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) provides:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
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Thus, the question presented was whether a violation of a disciplinary rule
constitutes a violation of state law. The court of criminal appeals decided it
does not. 133 The court considered the term "laws" in article 38.23 to be
tantamount to "statutes." 134 The judicial branch prepared the disciplinary
rules for an administrative agency, the State Bar of Texas, and courts have
described them as "quasi-statutory."' 135 Since the rules were not statutory
enactments of the legislature, 136 their violation does not constitute a viola-
tion of the laws of the State of Texas. 137 Thus, such violations committed by
a prosecutor will not bar the introduction of evidence resulting therefrom at
trial under the Texas statutory exclusionary rule.138
XI. FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL: EDWARDS REVISITED
The issue of whether and when an accused waives his right to counsel
under the fifth amendment after the accused has invoked that right contin-
ues as a fertile source of litigation in state and federal courts. The Supreme
Court held in Edwards v. Arizona 139 in 1981 that once an accused has in-
voked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, the
accused does not waive that right by responding to custodial interrogation,
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in
that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing
such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art. XII, § 8
(Code of Professional Responsibility) DR 7-104(A)(1) (1973); see State Bar of Texas, Comm.
on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, Op. 137 (1956).
133. 666 S.W.2d at 98.
134. Id.
135. See State ex rel. Chandler v. Dancer, 391 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cochran v. Cochran, 333 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rattikin Title Co. v. Grievance Comm. of the State Bar of
Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ).
136. The Texas Supreme Court promulgated the current Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity in 1971 pursuant to the enabling provisions of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 320a- 1, § 4
(Vernon 1973).
137. 666 S.W.2d at 98.
138. Id. The court relied heavily upon opinions from various federal circuits holding that
similar disciplinary rule violations by prosecutors do not violate the constitution and thus do
not necessitate suppression under federal law. See United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); United States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d 1406, 1407
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947 (1970); Wilson v. United States, 398 F.2d 331, 333 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069 (1969). The court in Pannell made no mention of
Henrich v. State, 666 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, pet. granted), which held precisely
the opposite in a very similar fact situation. The prosecutor in Henrich had secretly recorded
conversations between the defendant and co-defendant, without the knowledge of the defend-
ant's attorney. The Dallas court of appeals held that this clear violation of DR 7-104 required
suppression, in that the disciplinary rules have the same force and effect of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, which courts have held to have the same force and effect as statutes. See
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. 1973); Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148,
327 S.W.2d 428 (1959). The court concluded that the district attorney's violation of the disci-
plinary rule was the same as violating a statute, and required suppression under article 38.23 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Henrich, 666 S.W.2d at 186. Obviously, Pannel sub-
silentio overruled Henrich.
139. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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even if the police have already advised him of his rights. 140 After an accused
has expressed his desire to communicate with the police only through coun-
sel, he cannot be subject to further interrogation until counsel is available to
him, unless he himself initiates further communication with the police. 141
The question of waiver thus turns on whether the state has met its heavy
burden of establishing a conscious waiver of a known right or privilege, a
matter that a court must decide upon the particular facts and circumstances
of each case. 142 Since Edwards, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
consistently held that the state has not met this burden unless the evidence
clearly shows that the accused himself initiated the conversation or exchange
that resulted in the incriminating statement at issue. When the record is
silent or unclear as to which party initiated the exchange, the court will find
no waiver. 143 The Supreme Court held last term in Solem v. Stumes, 144
however, that courts should not apply Edwards retroactively, at least on col-
lateral attack.' 45  The Court observed that complete retroactive effect is
most appropriate only in cases wherein the purpose of a new constitutional
principle is to enhance the accuracy of criminal trials, 14 6 and noted that the
Edwards rule has only a tangential relation to truth-finding at trial.147 The
Court further opined that expecting law enforcement authorities to have
conducted themselves in accordance with the Edwards rule prior to its an-
nouncement would be unreasonable, and that retroactive application would
disrupt the administration of justice. 148
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals nevertheless demonstrated in two
cases during the survey period that the Edwards test will be applied retroac-
tively on direct appeal. In Wilkerson v. State149 the accused's attorney told
the police that the accused did not wish to speak with them further without
the attorney's presence. A police detective subsequently told the accused
140. Id. at 484.
141. Id. at 484-85.
142. Id. at 482 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Some of the relevant
circumstances include the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. 451 U.S. at
482.
143. See Phifer v. State, 651 S.W.2d 774, 780-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Coleman v. State,
646 S.W.2d 937, 940-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
144. 104 S. Ct. 1338, 79 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1984).
145. Id. at 1345, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 592. The Court established the general principles of
retroactivity in criminal cases in Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966), Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-29 (1966), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-39 (1965).
Under these cases, as the Court in Stumes noted, 104 S. Ct. at 1341, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 586-87, the
criteria for determining whether new judicially imposed standards apply retroactively are(a) the purpose served by the new standards, (b) the extent to which law enforcement authori-
ties rely on the old standards, and (c) the effect of a retroactive application on judicial adminis-
tration. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). A majority of the Court in United States
v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), endorsed a slightly different approach regarding retroactivity
of new fourth amendment standards. In Johnson the Court held that a decision construing the
fourth amendment that was not clearly different from prior decisions is applicable to all con-
victions not yet final when the Court issued the decision, at least on direct review. Id. at 562.
146. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 n.6 (1971).
147. 104 S. Ct. at 1342, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 587-88.
148. Id. at 1345, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 592.
149. 657 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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that the decision as to whether to talk was his alone and that he was free to
change his mind. Several hours later, the accused met with police officers
and expressed his desire to talk about the offense. After the officers read him
his rights, he gave a full confession to his involvement in a murder coupled
with robbery and kidnapping, which formed the basis of his conviction for
capital murder. Soon after, the accused fortuitously came into contact with
his attorney. His attorney asked him whether he really knew what he was
doing, to which the accused replied, "I had to do it." He then signed the
confession, which the court admitted into evidence at his trial. The court of
criminal appeals held that because the state failed to prove which party had
initiated the conference at which the accused gave his statement, the fact
that he appeared to understand fully his right to counsel and freely waived it
could not save the confession from suppression.' 50 The accused's failure to
request an attorney at the conference and his chance encounter with his at-
torney in the hallway were insufficient to satisfy the government's heavy bur-
den of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel under the
Edwards standard. 151 Thus, a silent record on the question of who initiated
the further exchange with the police that results in a confession clearly re-
quires a finding that the accused did not knowingly and intelligently waive
the fifth amendment right to counsel. 15 2
In Green v. State' 53 the accused repeatedly refused to respond to interro-
gation and requested an attorney subsequent to his arrest for murder. Over
a period of several days, he contacted three different attorneys, but he did
not retain any of them because he could not afford their respective attorneys'
fees. Each of these attorneys, however, gratuitously advised the accused not
to give a statement. In the meantime, a police detective summoned the ac-
cused to his office each day "to talk." The accused never gave any incrimi-
nating information at these meetings and continued his requests for the
assistance of counsel. The accused requested that an attorney be appointed
to represent him on grounds of indigency, but the police did not comply. He
then met with another attorney whose fee he was also unable to afford. He
finally relented and signed a confession because he was worried about the
charges and was feeling pressure from the detectives. The El Paso court of
appeals held that he knowingly and intelligently relinquished his right to
counsel because he had voluntarily given his confession after fee consulta-
tions with several attorneys who had told him not to give any statements to
150. Id. at 791-93.
151. Id. at 792; see supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text. The court conceded that
the confession was given voluntarily, but emphasized that such analysis was separate and dif-
ferent from the question of waiver. However voluntary such incriminating statements may be,
the Edwards approach must resolve the issue of waiver. 657 S.W.2d at 792.
152. The Wilkerson court observed that the appellant therein could more simply have
sought suppression on fourth amendment grounds, since his detainment was illegal for lack of
probable cause. Id. at 791 n.18; see Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981). The court in Wilkerson neglected to discuss whether TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 10 & 19
required its holding as well, although the appellant had invoked these provisions on appeal.
657 S.W.2d at 791.
153. 667 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
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the police. 154 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously reversed,
holding that the state had not met its heavy burden under Edwards155 and
that the accused had never received effective assistance of counsel in the first
place. 156 The court found that a brief conversation with an attorney regard-
ing fees for future services, even including free advice, is not sufficient con-
sultation so as to render the accused's decision as a knowing and intelligent
waiver.157 Significantly, the court held that the prosecution's failure to meet
its heavy burden under Edwards established a violation of the accused's right
to counsel under both the federal and state constitutions.158
154. Green v. State, 641 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no pet.).
155. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
156. 667 S.W.2d at 533-34.
157. Id.
158. The pertinent state constitutional provisions are contained in TEX. CONST. art. I,
§§ 10 & 19. The court thus appears to have adopted the Edwards rationale as a matter of state
constitutional law. In light of the current trend in the Supreme Court toward easing the pro-
phylactic rules it has imposed upon the government in other exclusionary rule contexts (see
supra notes 105-18 and accompanying text), defendants should always invoke these independ-
ent state constitutional provisions, both at the trial court level and on appeal.
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